So That’s Why It’s Called a Pyramid Scheme.
Posted using ShareThis
Saturday, November 07, 2009
Sunday, January 18, 2009
Freeze Them
While a boom may follow a downturn on the economic front, the recession at the fertility front is uni-directional. As per a recently read article, the count of sperm donors is outpacing the count of the little tadpoles of the the donors themselves.
These days more than donating, men want to make hay while the sperm can still swim. They freeze their prototypes for future just in case. The current lifestyle, food habits already had robbed half our manhood from us as compared to our ancestors. Our stress levels, laptops and cell phones are all set to reduce our member to a mere harmless water-gun
Days are not far wherein our appendix will have a distant brother down there as another vestigial organ. And fathering a child, (though our male ego doesnt accept the impending danger) is going to become a "Black Swan" event in two three decades. If you see it, even now also, only one in a billion of them has a chance to hit the goal and the probability is going to worsen.
For those who are in their 30's ,and still looking for a better soil to plant their seeds, should seriously consider depositing in this bank before their reserves dry up. It is a reality even in India wherein the donor can freeze his swimming pellets and draw upon in case of need. Apparently they take the stuff in four lots and you can replenish it every six months. This way you can make use of them instead of flushing them down the drain every day till the D day.
Once you hedge your fertility (Virility is anyways within the four walls), you can happily take stress and still sire your own child. So, unfasten your belts and brace yourselves for the sudden jerks.
Source - http://blogument.blogspot.com/2008/11/freeze-them.html
Thursday, November 13, 2008
Wednesday, September 19, 2007
Effective Ways
When times get rough, there's no choice except to take a deep breath, carry on, and do the best you can.
Monday, August 20, 2007
इंडिया 123accord
On a quick reading, the “Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (known as the 123 Agreement) — slated to be in force for 40 years and a further 20 years in 10-year tranches — appears to be as fair a document as New Delhi could have wrung from Washington given the fact that it is a new entrant to the “nuclear powers” club whil e the US is probably its most powerful member। One has purposely used the imagery of India being one of the planet’s nuclear powers because that is precisely what the agreement seems to suggest in places.Thus, at the very beginning, the point is ‘affirmed’ that the agreement is “between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation”। In Article 13, which focuses on ‘Consultations’, the point is again reiterated that the ‘consultations’ would be “between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology”. This description of India is certainly one that will add to its international image and is, to that extent, a plus point for New Delhi.Secondly, the distinction has been made that the agreement relates to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the two countries with no links whatever to the non-peaceful aspect save and except where there is leakage from one the former to the latter. Thus, at the very beginning, the point is made that the two Governments recognise “the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner” and are committed to cooperating “extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis”. Article 2(4) lays the cards openly on the table when it states that the “Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party। Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement”. It states further the agreement “shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes”.Thirdly, since (as of now) India cannot further develop its nuclear programmes in isolation and needs a constant flow of fuel to feed its reactors at home, the US commitment to assist New Delhi in this endeavour cannot but be welcome. Article 5 (6a) says that, “Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors”, adding that, “As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations”. Under Article 5(6b) a number of additional steps have been listed which Washington is willing to take to “guard against any disruption of fuel supplies” to India. Among these are Washington’s willingness “to incorporate assurances” on fuel supply to India for peaceful uses of nuclear energy “under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the US Congress”. The US would also join India “in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement” and would support any effort by New Delhi “to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”। Of special significance is sub-section (iv) which says that “If, despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India”.But, of course, what is the price India will be paying for this US initiative in helping its civil nuclear programme? Accepting the IAEA safeguards regime is one, which has been openly accepted by both the parties. Among other things, the agreement states that both Washington and New Delhi have affirmed “their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. More importantly, Article 10(2) states that fuel and associated material supplied by Washington would be “subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA and an Additional Protocol, when in force”. This may sound inordinately harsh, but if things are above board as far as New Delhi’s civil nuclear programme is concerned, no material harm can befall the national interest by such a safeguards clause in practical terms (as opposed to emotional considerations)।As regards reasons for termination of the agreement are concerned, the Agreement says that the “Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation”, adding significantly that they would “agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security”. A nuclear test by India, for instance? The question is: Would the US Hyde hurdle allow something like this to pass muster?
१२३अccord
On a quick reading, the “Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (known as the 123 Agreement) — slated to be in force for 40 years and a further 20 years in 10-year tranches — appears to be as fair a document as New Delhi could have wrung from Washington given the fact that it is a new entrant to the “nuclear powers” club whil e the US is probably its most powerful member। One has purposely used the imagery of India being one of the planet’s nuclear powers because that is precisely what the agreement seems to suggest in places.Thus, at the very beginning, the point is ‘affirmed’ that the agreement is “between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation”। In Article 13, which focuses on ‘Consultations’, the point is again reiterated that the ‘consultations’ would be “between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology”. This description of India is certainly one that will add to its international image and is, to that extent, a plus point for New Delhi.Secondly, the distinction has been made that the agreement relates to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the two countries with no links whatever to the non-peaceful aspect save and except where there is leakage from one the former to the latter. Thus, at the very beginning, the point is made that the two Governments recognise “the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner” and are committed to cooperating “extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis”. Article 2(4) lays the cards openly on the table when it states that the “Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party। Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement”. It states further the agreement “shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes”.Thirdly, since (as of now) India cannot further develop its nuclear programmes in isolation and needs a constant flow of fuel to feed its reactors at home, the US commitment to assist New Delhi in this endeavour cannot but be welcome. Article 5 (6a) says that, “Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors”, adding that, “As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations”. Under Article 5(6b) a number of additional steps have been listed which Washington is willing to take to “guard against any disruption of fuel supplies” to India. Among these are Washington’s willingness “to incorporate assurances” on fuel supply to India for peaceful uses of nuclear energy “under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the US Congress”. The US would also join India “in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement” and would support any effort by New Delhi “to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”। Of special significance is sub-section (iv) which says that “If, despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India”.But, of course, what is the price India will be paying for this US initiative in helping its civil nuclear programme? Accepting the IAEA safeguards regime is one, which has been openly accepted by both the parties. Among other things, the agreement states that both Washington and New Delhi have affirmed “their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. More importantly, Article 10(2) states that fuel and associated material supplied by Washington would be “subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA and an Additional Protocol, when in force”. This may sound inordinately harsh, but if things are above board as far as New Delhi’s civil nuclear programme is concerned, no material harm can befall the national interest by such a safeguards clause in practical terms (as opposed to emotional considerations)।As regards reasons for termination of the agreement are concerned, the Agreement says that the “Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation”, adding significantly that they would “agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security”. A nuclear test by India, for instance? The question is: Would the US Hyde hurdle allow something like this to pass muster?
Aspects of the 123 accord
On a quick reading, the “Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy” (known as the 123 Agreement) — slated to be in force for 40 years and a further 20 years in 10-year tranches — appears to be as fair a document as New Delhi could have wrung from Washington given the fact that it is a new entrant to the “nuclear powers” club whil e the US is probably its most powerful member। One has purposely used the imagery of India being one of the planet’s nuclear powers because that is precisely what the agreement seems to suggest in places.
Thus, at the very beginning, the point is ‘affirmed’ that the agreement is “between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation”। In Article 13, which focuses on ‘Consultations’, the point is again reiterated that the ‘consultations’ would be “between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology”. This description of India is certainly one that will add to its international image and is, to that extent, a plus point for New Delhi.
Secondly, the distinction has been made that the agreement relates to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the two countries with no links whatever to the non-peaceful aspect save and except where there is leakage from one the former to the latter. Thus, at the very beginning, the point is made that the two Governments recognise “the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner” and are committed to cooperating “extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis”.
Article 2(4) lays the cards openly on the table when it states that the “Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party। Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement”. It states further the agreement “shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes”.
Thirdly, since (as of now) India cannot further develop its nuclear programmes in isolation and needs a constant flow of fuel to feed its reactors at home, the US commitment to assist New Delhi in this endeavour cannot but be welcome. Article 5 (6a) says that, “Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors”, adding that, “As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations”.
Under Article 5(6b) a number of additional steps have been listed which Washington is willing to take to “guard against any disruption of fuel supplies” to India. Among these are Washington’s willingness “to incorporate assurances” on fuel supply to India for peaceful uses of nuclear energy “under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the US Congress”.
The US would also join India “in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement” and would support any effort by New Delhi “to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”। Of special significance is sub-section (iv) which says that “If, despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India”.
But, of course, what is the price India will be paying for this US initiative in helping its civil nuclear programme? Accepting the IAEA safeguards regime is one, which has been openly accepted by both the parties. Among other things, the agreement states that both Washington and New Delhi have affirmed “their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
More importantly, Article 10(2) states that fuel and associated material supplied by Washington would be “subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA and an Additional Protocol, when in force”.
This may sound inordinately harsh, but if things are above board as far as New Delhi’s civil nuclear programme is concerned, no material harm can befall the national interest by such a safeguards clause in practical terms (as opposed to emotional considerations)।
As regards reasons for termination of the agreement are concerned, the Agreement says that the “Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation”, adding significantly that they would “agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security”.
A nuclear test by India, for instance? The question is: Would the US Hyde hurdle allow something like this to pass muster?
Thus, at the very beginning, the point is ‘affirmed’ that the agreement is “between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation”। In Article 13, which focuses on ‘Consultations’, the point is again reiterated that the ‘consultations’ would be “between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology”. This description of India is certainly one that will add to its international image and is, to that extent, a plus point for New Delhi.
Secondly, the distinction has been made that the agreement relates to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by the two countries with no links whatever to the non-peaceful aspect save and except where there is leakage from one the former to the latter. Thus, at the very beginning, the point is made that the two Governments recognise “the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner” and are committed to cooperating “extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis”.
Article 2(4) lays the cards openly on the table when it states that the “Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party। Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement”. It states further the agreement “shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes”.
Thirdly, since (as of now) India cannot further develop its nuclear programmes in isolation and needs a constant flow of fuel to feed its reactors at home, the US commitment to assist New Delhi in this endeavour cannot but be welcome. Article 5 (6a) says that, “Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors”, adding that, “As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations”.
Under Article 5(6b) a number of additional steps have been listed which Washington is willing to take to “guard against any disruption of fuel supplies” to India. Among these are Washington’s willingness “to incorporate assurances” on fuel supply to India for peaceful uses of nuclear energy “under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the US Congress”.
The US would also join India “in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement” and would support any effort by New Delhi “to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”। Of special significance is sub-section (iv) which says that “If, despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India”.
But, of course, what is the price India will be paying for this US initiative in helping its civil nuclear programme? Accepting the IAEA safeguards regime is one, which has been openly accepted by both the parties. Among other things, the agreement states that both Washington and New Delhi have affirmed “their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.
More importantly, Article 10(2) states that fuel and associated material supplied by Washington would be “subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA and an Additional Protocol, when in force”.
This may sound inordinately harsh, but if things are above board as far as New Delhi’s civil nuclear programme is concerned, no material harm can befall the national interest by such a safeguards clause in practical terms (as opposed to emotional considerations)।
As regards reasons for termination of the agreement are concerned, the Agreement says that the “Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation”, adding significantly that they would “agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party’s serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security”.
A nuclear test by India, for instance? The question is: Would the US Hyde hurdle allow something like this to pass muster?
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
